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“Magic Words” and Original 
Understanding: An Amplified Clear 
Statement Rule to Abrogate Tribal 
Sovereign Immunity 
“There is not one example in all of history where the Supreme Court has 
found that Congress intended to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity without 





The Indian plenary power doctrine—an invention of the late nineteenth-
century Supreme Court—grants Congress exclusive authority to legislate with 
respect to Indian tribes, including the ability to abrogate tribal sovereign 
immunity.  Under current doctrine, Congress must “unequivocally express” 
its intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes with “explicit 
legislation.”  Circuit courts tasked with applying this standard have split on 
the level of textual specificity required to strip tribes of their immunity.  
Employing the tools of statutory construction, courts are divided over whether 
the term ‘domestic government,’ as found in Section 106 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, unequivocally covers Indian tribes.  Because the purported power 
Congress exercises to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity is constitutionally 
dubious as an original matter, this Article contends that courts should only 
find abrogation when Congress leaves no doubt that it is acting in reliance 
upon that power.  Specifically, the persuasive originalist critique of the Indian 
plenary power doctrine’s historical incorrectness licenses the adoption of a 
“magic words” clear statement rule.  Under the proposed rule, Congress must 
expressly mention ‘Indian tribes’ or a closely associated term somewhere in 
the statute’s text to effectuate the abrogation of a tribe’s sovereign immunity.  
 
 1. Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis., 836 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re 
Greektown Holdings, LLC, 532 B.R. 680, 693 (E.D. Mich. 2015)). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In American law, Indian tribes are separate, independent “sovereigns with 
a direct relationship” to the federal government.2  As a consequence, Indian 
tribes ordinarily enjoy sovereign immunity from suit.3  Congress, however, 
occasionally sees fit to abrogate this immunity.4  Yet under the Supreme 
Court’s current doctrine, Congress must “unequivocally express” its intent to 
abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes with “explicit legislation.”5  
The abrogation of Indian tribal sovereign immunity “cannot be implied.”6  
Circuit courts tasked with applying this standard have split on the level of 
textual specificity required to abrogate Indian tribal immunity.  Specifically, 
the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit are currently divided on whether the 
term “domestic government,” as found in Section 106 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, unequivocally covers Indian tribes.7 
Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code “abrogate[s]” the “sovereign 
 
 2. Sarah Krakoff, They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race, and the Constitutional 
Minimum, 69 STAN. L. REV. 491, 491 (2017); see also  
Michael Bevilacqua, Silent Intent? Analyzing the Congressional Intent Required to Abrogate Tribal 
Sovereign Immunity, 61 B.C. L. REV. E-Supplement II.-156, II.–156 (2020) (“Indian tribes have long 
been considered distinct political communities that pre-exist the United States Constitution, and as 
such, retain many of their rights to self-governance.”).  I use the term “Indian tribe(s)” throughout this 
Article, as the term is firmly ensconced in statutes, case law, and historical vocabulary.  I also use the 
term ‘tribe’ to describe Native polities of the late eighteenth-century founding era. 
 3. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998) (explaining that Indian tribes can 
only be sued under federal law if Congress has abrogated the tribe’s immunity or if the tribe has waived 
its immunity). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58–59 (1978); see also In re Platinum Oil 
Properties, LLC, 465 B.R. 621, 642-43 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2011) (“Tribal sovereign immunity is not 
absolute, however, and can be abrogated by Congress.  Congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign 
immunity must be explicit; abrogation may not be implied.”); Scott C. Hall, The Indian Law Canons 
of Construction v. The Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent and the Unambiguous Answer to the 
Ambiguous Problem, 37 CONN. L. REV. 495, 497 (2004) (noting that when congressional “intent can 
be ascertained, the court will give it effect whether it is for or against the Indians, [but] [w]hen it 
cannot be ascertained, the ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the Indians”).  But see Bryan H. 
Wildenthal, Indian Sovereignty, General Federal Laws, and the Canons of Construction: An Overview 
and Update, 6 AM. INDIAN L. J. 99, 163 (2017) (“It has been clear for more than 30 years that the 
Supreme Court will not require an explicit statement in statutory text for Congress to limit tribal 
rights.”) (emphasis in original). 
 6. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58. 
 7. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F.3d 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting that “this issue ‘has 
been analyzed by a handful of courts, leading to two irreconcilable conclusions.’”) (citation omitted); 
see also Meyers, 836 F.3d at 826 (“We need not weigh in on the conflict between these courts on how 
to interpret the breadth the term ‘other domestic governments’ under the Bankruptcy Code.”).  
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immunity” of “a governmental unit.”8  The term “governmental unit,” defined 
in Section 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code, comprises a long list of entities,9 
including any “foreign or domestic government.”10  As a matter of statutory 
interpretation, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “domestic government” 
covers Indian tribes.11  Any other interpretation, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, 
would create surplusage, as no entity other than an Indian tribe can logically 
be considered a domestic government.12  Taking the opposite position, the 
Sixth Circuit instead held that “domestic government” does not unequivocally 
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.13  The Sixth Circuit’s underlying 
rationale hinged on precedent, normative values, and historical practice—
namely, that Congress has never abrogated tribal sovereign immunity without 
including magic words such as “tribe” or “Native American” in the statutory 
text.14 
In response to this entrenched circuit conflict, this Article argues that the 
Sixth Circuit’s outcome is correct, but for a different reason: As the purported 
power Congress employs to abrogate a tribe’s sovereign immunity is 
constitutionally dubious as an original matter, courts should only find 
abrogation when Congress leaves no doubt that it is acting in reliance upon 
that power.  Since the turn of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has 
recognized the Indian plenary power doctrine.15  That doctrine suggests that 
 
 8. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2012); see also 1 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY 1.01[l] (16th ed. 2011) (quoting Hanover Nat’1 Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192 
(1902)) (noting that “[b]ankruptcy legislation in the United States is the way ‘to grant a fresh start to 
the honest but unfortunate debtor.’”); Stephan A. Hoover, Forcing the Tribe to Bet on the House: The 
Limited Options and Risks to the Tribe when Indian Gaming Operations Seek Bankruptcy Relief, 49 
CAL. W. L. REV. 269, 277 (2013) (“Although the legislative power to enact national bankruptcy laws 
is enshrined in the Constitution, it was not until 1800 that Congress enacted the first federal bankruptcy 
legislation.”).  
 9. Domestic government may plausibly be interpreted to include state or municipal governments.  
Yet Section 101(27) explicitly lists both.  See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (2012). Given the explicit mention 
of both state and municipal governments, the Ninth Circuit deduced that a domestic government 
logically must cover Indian tribes.  See infra Part IV. 
 10. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. 
 14. Id; see also Bevilacqua, supra note 2, at p. II.–157 (exploring the Sixth Circuit’s decision and 
the case’s factual and procedural background).  
 15. For purposes of this Article, and to avoid any potential confusion, the plenary power doctrine 
will be used in reference only to Congress’s exclusive authority over Indian affairs.  See United States–
Crow Treaty –– Federal Indian Law –– Indian Plenary Power Doctrine –– Herrera v. Wyoming, 404 
HARV. L. REV. 402, 407 (2019) [hereinafter United States–Crow Treaty] (using the phrase “the Indian 
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“the Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect 
to Indian tribes, powers that . . . have [been] consistently described as ‘plenary 
and exclusive.’”16  Implicit in Congress’s broad inherent legislative power 
over Indian tribes is Congress’s authority to abrogate tribal immunity.  To put 
it differently, the Indian plenary power doctrine is “premised on the . . . 
absolute sovereignty of the United States” over the Indian tribes, inclusive of 
the power to abrogate tribal immunity.17 
As an original matter, the premise upon which the Indian plenary power 
doctrine stands is unsteady.18  Even as originalists have increasingly 
questioned the original correctness of the Indian plenary power doctrine,19 the 
Court continues to adhere to the doctrine in part out of deference to stare 
decisis.20  This Article asserts that original doubt about the correctness of the 
Indian plenary power doctrine warrants the adoption of a magic words clear 
statement rule.21  Courts, in other words, should intensify the linguistic trigger 
that Congress must satisfy to exercise an inherent power it likely does not 
 
plenary power doctrine”).  Likewise, this Article, like Professor Sai Prakash’s Article, “uses ‘plenary 
power’ in the sense in which the courts use it—that is, an all-encompassing legislative power that lacks 
subject-matter limitations.”  Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
1069, 1071 n.2 (2004). 
 16. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004). 
 17. United States–Crow Treaty, supra note 15, at 407.  
 18. The fact that some originalists exhibit trepidation when it comes to abrogating Indian tribal 
immunity may be attributed to the originalist methodology.  M. Alexander Pearl, Originalism and 
Indians, 93 TUL. L. REV. 269, 294 (2018) (“Originalism is under-theorized as applied to tribal 
sovereignty and the position of Indian tribes within the United States’ constitutional structure.”).  The 
originalist methodology presumes that the proper manner by which to interpret text “is 
‘archaeological’—to dig up evidence regarding the meaning, intention, or purpose” of the text and the 
text’s drafters at the time the drafting occurred.  John C. Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an 
Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 772, 801 (1995). 
 19. See infra Part V. 
 20. See Amy C. Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1016-38 
(2003) (explaining the history and also the functional utility of stare decisis); see also Justin W. 
Aimonetti, Second Guessing Double Jeopardy: The Stare Decisis Factors as Proxy Tools for Original 
Correctness, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2020) (exploring stare decisis and how the stare 
decisis factors may be used to evaluate a precedent’s correctness as an original matter).  
 21. Clear statement rules are traditionally employed to “avoid applications of otherwise 
unambiguous statutes that would intrude on sensitive domains in a way that Congress is unlikely to 
have intended had it considered the matter.”  Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Lines Ltd. 545 U.S. 119, 
139 (2005) (“[C]lear statement rules ensure Congress does not, by broad or general language, legislate 
on a sensitive topic inadvertently or without due deliberation.”); see also Amy C. Barrett, Substantive 
Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 118 (2010) (“Canons in this category are often 
expressed as ‘clear statement rules’ that require a court to interpret a statute to avoid a particular result 
unless Congress speaks explicitly to accomplish it.”).  
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possess.  That textual trigger should require Congress to expressly mention 
Indian tribes or a closely associated term somewhere in the statute’s text to 
abrogate tribal immunity.22  This clear statement rule ensures efficient 
avoidance of potential constitutional violations and thus relates to “the 
longstanding principle that courts should not lightly interpret a statute in a 
way that makes it unconstitutional if some other interpretation is available.”23  
Under the proposed rule, the legislature must use magic words (expressly 
mentioning Indian tribes or a closely associated term) that leave no doubt 
about Congress’s intent to abrogate tribal immunity.24  Additionally, this 
interpretative principle reinforces the assessment that “an originalist view of 
the Constitution can produce a constitutional understanding of Indian tribes 
that actually supports a robust construction of tribal sovereignty.”25 
In making this argument, this Article proceeds in four Parts.  Part II 
briefly details the history of tribal immunity to situate the doctrine in its 
historical context.  Part III explores the development of Congress’s plenary 
power over tribal sovereignty.  This Part also examines the Constitution’s text, 
 
 22. Bevilacqua, supra note 2, at p. II.–170 (noting that “it is difficult to imagine a scenario where 
Congress unequivocally expresses an intent without mentioning Indian tribes by name”). 
 23. Caleb Nelson, Avoiding Constitutional Questions Versus Avoiding Unconstitutionality, 128 
HARV. L. REV. F. 331, 331 (2015).  This Article’s proposed rule importantly does not rest upon the 
distinct canon of constitutional avoidance.  That canon advances the “idea that courts should try to 
interpret statutes so as to avoid raising difficult questions of constitutional law.”  Id.  By contrast, the 
proposed rule argues that courts should force Congress to explicitly rely on a power it likely does not 
possess by invoking the magic words in the statute’s text.  I discuss the canon of constitutional 
avoidance in further detail infra at note 176. 
 24. There is no reason why the Supreme Court—instead of opting for the costly decision of 
overruling dubious precedents like the Indian plenary power doctrine—cannot instead extend clear 
statement rules to limit the reach of likely originally incorrect precedent.  Bryan H. Wildenthal, supra 
note 5, at 163 n.271 (“The Supreme Court appeared to come close to such an explicit ‘plain statement’ 
rule, at least for treaty abrogation, in Justice William O. Douglas’s majority opinion in Menominee 
Tribe v. United States.”).  The Court’s current inquiry to determine whether a state’s immunity has 
been abrogated tracks with this Article’s proposal.  See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 
(1996) (citation omitted) (“In order to determine whether Congress has abrogated the States’ sovereign 
immunity, we ask two questions: first, whether Congress has ‘unequivocally expressed its intent to 
abrogate the immunity,’ and second, whether Congress has acted ‘pursuant to a valid exercise of 
power.’”) (citations omitted).  This Article, however, does recognize that the proposed rule may be 
inconsistent with the Court’s statutory interpretation jurisprudence.  See FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 
284, 291 (2018) (citing Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 589 (2008)) (explaining that 
the Court has never required Congress to state its intent in any particular manner, and that courts 
should still use other tools of statutory construction in assessing congressional intent, even in the 
sovereign immunity context).  Nevertheless, the proposed rule is justified given the Indian plenary 
power doctrine’s dubious original correctness.  
 25. Pearl, supra note 18, at 271. 
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historical practice, judicial critiques, and academic scholarship to further call 
into question the correctness of the plenary power doctrine as an original 
matter.  Part IV describes the current circuit split on the question whether 
“domestic government” unequivocally covers Indian tribes.  In conclusion, 
Part V argues that so long as the Court adheres to the constitutionally dubious 
plenary power doctrine, the Court should require that for Congress to abrogate 
tribal sovereign immunity, it must satisfy a magic words clear statement rule 
by expressly mentioning “Indian tribes” or a closely associated term in the 
statute’s text. 
II. THE DEEP HISTORICAL ROOTS OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Sovereign immunity’s general premise is simple—one cannot sue a 
sovereign government.26  The doctrine protects sovereign governments “from 
nonconsensual suit, except in certain narrowly prescribed circumstances.”27  
The origin of sovereign immunity predates the Constitution.28  Historians have 
generally traced its roots to the English concept of the divine right of royalty, 
in which the monarch could do no wrong and therefore no suit against the 
monarchy could be legitimate.29  Regardless of its exact genesis, modern 
 
 26. See Ridge Howell, Overlooking Canon: How the Alabama Supreme Court Used a Footnote to 
Disregard Tribal Sovereign Immunity in Wilkes v. PCI Gaming Authority, 43 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
437, 437 (2019).  But see John Alan Cohan, Sovereignty in a Postsovereign World, 18 FLA. J. INT’L 
L. 907, 909 (2006) (“Today, sovereignty is anything but simple.  There is disagreement as to the nature 
of sovereignty, whether it is a relevant sort of concept in geopolitics, and whether there is a one-size-
fits all definition.”). 
 27. Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under 
Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American 
Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 662 (2013).  
 28. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (“When the Constitution was ratified, it was well 
established in English law that the Crown could not be sued without consent in its own courts.”); see 
also Kyle S. Conway, Inherently or Exclusively Federal: Constitutional Preemption and 
the Relationship Between Public Law 280 and Federalism, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1323, 1338 (2013) 
(describing the American people’s understanding of sovereignty at the founding); THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that sovereign immunity “is the general sense, and the general 
practice of mankind”).  
 29. See Daniel T. Murphy, The American Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity: An Historical Analysis, 
13 VILL. L. REV. 583 (1968) (exploring the history of sovereign immunity in American jurisprudence).  
Professor Katherine Florey’s research suggests that “the idea that sovereigns enjoy immunity from 
suit under some circumstances is a well-entrenched jurisprudential notion, dating back at least to 
medieval England.”  Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the 
Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595, 616 (2010).  There admittedly exists much 
debate over where exactly the historical starting point should be temporally located.  See Michalyn 
Steele, Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 63 UCLA L. REV. 666 
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doctrine extends sovereign immunity to the federal government, state 
governments, foreign governments, and to Indian tribes.30 
Today, the Supreme Court rests the justification for tribal sovereign 
immunity on the “common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by 
sovereign powers.”31  Indian tribal immunity was historically understood as 
an essential and inherent doctrine, that did not depend on colonial or federal 
law for either its recognition or its scope.32  Even before the Court wielded the 
judicial power of the United States, Indian tribes had long been recognized as 
“separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution.”33 
Professor Alexander Pearl has explained that the separate sovereign status 
of Indian tribes is linked to the fact that “tribes predate[d] the Constitution and 
 
(2016) (discussing the intellectual debate over both the origins and meaning of sovereignty).  As the 
Supreme Court explained in Nevada v. Hall, “[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is an amalgam of 
two quite different concepts, one applicable to suits in the sovereign’s own courts and the other to suits 
in the courts of another sovereign.”  440 U.S. 410, 414 (1979).  But see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 
728–29 (1999) (describing principles of state sovereign immunity as “fundamental postulates implicit 
in the constitutional design”); Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 
476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986) (“The common law sovereign immunity possessed by the Tribe is a 
necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance.”). 
 30. See generally Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law, “Accident,” 
and Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765 (2008) 
(explaining sovereign immunity’s extensions). 
 31. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014) (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)).  As a dependent sovereign entity, an Indian tribe is not subject to 
suit in a federal or state court unless the tribe’s sovereign immunity has been either abrogated by 
Congress or waived by the tribe.  See Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007, 
1009–10 (10th Cir. 2007).  It is also worth noting that when it comes to the origin of tribal sovereign 
immunity, the Supreme Court has confusingly explained the doctrine’s evolution, stating in one case 
that the doctrine “developed almost by accident.”  Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 
756–57 (1998) (citing Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919)); see also Florey, supra note 29, 
at 596 (“the precise definition of the sovereignty tribes enjoy within the United States has long been 
an uneasy matter.”).  
 32. Whitaker v. Dakota Finance Corp. (In re Whitaker), 474 B.R. 687, 690–91 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 
2012) (citations, internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted) (“Unlike the immunity of states, 
which derives from the Eleventh Amendment, the immunity of tribes is a matter of common law, 
which has been recognized as integral to the sovereignty and self-governance of tribes.”); see also 
Hoover, supra note 8, at 270 (“The United States has needed to integrate sovereign Indian nations into 
the American system of jurisprudence since its inception.”). 
 33. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. at 788 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56); see 
also Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 694 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that tribal 
immunity “predates the birth of the Republic.”); Robert J. Miller, Consultation or Consent: The United 
States Duty to Confer with American Indian Governments, 91 N.D. L. REV. 37, 41 (2015) (“Long 
before Europeans began colonizing North America, indigenous peoples and Indian nations governed 
themselves through various governmental entities.”). 
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European colonizers.”34  Upon arrival to North America, European settlers 
“encountered hundreds of tribal nations possessing sovereignty over their 
lands and their people.”35  These Indian peoples lived in distinct communities, 
“created institutions and systems, and governed themselves, sharing territories 
within North America prior to European contact.”36  As Chief Justice Marshall 
explained in Worcester v. Georgia: “America, separated from Europe by a 
wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people, divided into separate nations, 
independent of each other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of 
their own, and governing themselves by their own laws.”37 
When early Europeans interacted with Indians, “treaty-making regulated 
interactions and relationships between Indian nations and their people, on the 
one hand, and European nations and their colonial settlers, on the other 
hand.”38  As Indian tribes were understood to be sovereign separate nations, 
Europeans formally dealt with the various tribes “solely by treaty.”39  These 
treaties, although frequently ignored and often broken, reflected the European 
settlers’ recognition of “the importance of cooperating with the powerful 
Indian tribes, treating them as sovereigns possessing full rights of ownership 
of lands and requiring negotiation and treaty-making.”40  From a legal 
 
 34. Pearl, supra note 18, at 271; see also Am. Indian Agric. Credit Consortium v. Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted) (“Indian tribes enjoy immunity 
because they are sovereigns predating the Constitution.”). 
 35. Angela R. Riley, Native Nations and the Constitution: An Inquiry into “Extra-
Constitutionality,” 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 173, 179 (2017) [hereinafter Riley, Native Nations]; see also 
Angela R. Riley, The History of Native American Lands and the Supreme Court, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 
369, 369 (2013) [hereinafter Riley, History of Native American Lands] (“When Europeans first made 
contact with this continent, they encountered hundreds of indigenous, sovereign nations representing 
enormous diversity in terms of language, culture, religion, and governance.”). 
 36. Seielstad, supra note 27, at 683.  
 37. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 542–43 (1832) (emphasis added).  
 38. Seielstad, supra note 27, at 683; see also Miller, supra note 33, at 43 (“England and the English 
colonies, for example, signed scores of treaties with tribes on the east coast of North America, engaged 
in extensive diplomatic relations with Indians, and in England, the Crown even received diplomatic 
visits from North American tribal representatives.”).  
 39. Pearl, supra note 18, at 300; see also Riley, History of Native American Lands, supra note 35, 
at 369 (noting that “[h]istorically, treaties were the primary mechanism for recognition of Indian 
lands.”); Robert N. Clinton, The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 846, 
851 (1980) (“The Crown generally adhered to the view that, as separate peoples, the Indians were 
politically and legally autonomous within their territory until they voluntarily ceded their land to the 
Crown or were conquered in a just war, a view suggested by both international law and English 
common law.”); Lance F. Sorenson, Tribal Sovereignty and the Recognition Power, 42 AM. INDIAN 
L. REV. 69, 97 (2017) (“English colonial governments recognized the sovereignty of Native American 
tribes and negotiated directly with them without much colonial coordination.”) 
 40. Seielstad, supra note 27, at 684; see also Robert A. Williams, Jr., “The People of the States 
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perspective, “these treaties were properly [considered] ‘international 
agreements’ since they involved European colonial sovereigns and indigenous 
political entities.”41  Categorizing such treaties as international agreements 
also meant that “the British Crown and several of its colonies dealt with the 
Indian tribes as wholly independent foreign nations.”42  These Indian treaties 
were thus “fundamental, constitutive document[s]” that affirmed the 
sovereign status of the signatory tribes.43 
Once the American Revolution sprung and the colonies cut the cord that 
tied them to English control, the nascent states continued to treat the Indian 
tribes as independent sovereign nations.  The newly independent states, acting 
together through the Continental Congress,44 entered into treaties with Indian 
tribes that “guaranteed the tribes legal and political autonomy.”45  Although 
“not always voluntary or balanced,” negotiations between the Continental 
Congress and tribal nations were premised on the ideal “that the Indian nations 
were pre-existing sovereign populations with legitimate, legal rights to their 
lands and resources.”46 
One noteworthy example arises out of the Treaty with the Delawares, the 
first treaty signed by the Continental Congress.47  The treaty’s language 
 
Where They Are Found Are Often Their Deadliest Enemies”: The Indian Side of the Story of Indian 
Rights and Federalism, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 981, 988 (1996) (“[T]hroughout the nearly two centuries-
long period of their initial multicultural encounter, Indians and whites negotiated hundreds of treaties, 
and engendered a set of legal traditions that today, at least according to the Indian side of the story of 
Indian rights in this country, forms much of the core of our Federal Indian Law.”). 
 41. Pearl, supra note 18, at 300; see also Theresa R. Wilson, Nations Within a Nation: The 
Evolution of Tribal Immunity, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 99, 103 (1999) (noting that the subject matter 
of such treaties typically centered around military concerns, as “[m]any of these treaties were military 
alliances created to bolster the colonies’ strength”). 
 42. William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 
1, 2 (1987). 
 43. Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and 
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 408 (1993).  
 44. Miller, supra note 33, at 44 (“In September 1774, the thirteen English/American colonies 
created their first national government, the loosely organized Continental Congress.”).  
 45. Clinton, supra note 39 at 854; see also Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional 
Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 521 (1995) (“[The Confederation Congress] examined the prospect 
of new Dutch loans, continued the Spanish negotiations, negotiated with the Indians, and pursued other 
diplomatic issues.”). 
 46. Riley, History of Native American Lands, supra note 35, at 370; see also Miller, supra note 
33, at 43 (“Negotiating, entering agreements, and engaging in diplomacy with other governments was 
a regular practice of American Indian nations.”). 
 47. S. LYMAN TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 34 (1973) (“The first treaty made with 
Indians by the Continental Congress was that with the Delawares in 1778.”); see also Ezra Rosser, 
The Nature of Representation: The Cherokee Right to a Congressional Delegate, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. 
[Vol. 2020: 1] “Magic Words” and Original Understanding 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
11 
clearly contemplates the independent sovereign status of the Delaware 
Indians.  Article IV of the treaty, for instance, posits that “neither party shall 
proceed to the infliction of punishments on the citizens of the other.”48  The 
language of Article VI likewise implies that the tribe retained its sovereign 
status, as the Article states that “the United States do engage to guarantee to 
the aforesaid nation of Delawares, and their heirs, all their territorial rights in 
the fullest and most ample manner, as it hath been bounded by former treaties, 
as long as they said Delaware nation shall abide.”49  This Article not only 
expressly acknowledges the Delaware Nation’s sovereignty, but it also 
pledges to honor past treaties formulated during the colonial era.  The 
Continental Congress thus clearly understood the historic precedent of treaty-
making between European and Indian peoples.50  The pact between the 
Continental Congress and the Delaware Nation also demonstrates that 
“treaties between the United States and Indian tribes are among the oldest 
binding laws,” as “several even predate the federal government itself.”51  In 
the years leading up to the Constitutional Convention, the fledging states in 
the post-revolutionary period adhered to the colonial practice of using treaties 
to facilitate relations with Indian tribes.52  Professor Samuel Tyler has 
 
L. J. 91, 121 (2005) (discussing the treaty in detail); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Sovereign Comity: 
Factors Recognizing Tribal Court Criminal Convictions in State and Federal Courts, 45 CT. REV. NO. 
12, 1, 1 (2009) (“One of the earliest treaties executed and ratified by the United States came during 
the Revolutionary War in a treaty with the Delaware Nation.”). 
 48. Treaty with the Delawares, U.S.–Del. Nation, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13, art IV (emphasis 
added). 
 49. Id. at art. VI (emphasis added). 
 50. Article VI also makes clear that “it is further agreed on between the contracting parties should 
it for the future be found conducive for the mutual interest of both parties to invite any other tribes 
who have been friends to the interest of the United States, to join the present the present confederation, 
and to form a state whereof the Delaware nation shall be the head.”  Id.  The implication from such 
language is that until the tribe willingly agreed to join the confederation and form a state, the tribe 
retained its sovereign status. 
 51. Philip P. Frickey, Indian Canon Originalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1100, 1100 n.1 (2013); see 
also Kyle S. Conway, supra note 28, at 1352 (“The negotiation of federal treaties continued 
throughout the confederation period, and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which created a 
government for western territories, contained broad protections for tribes and greatly centralized 
power to deal with them in the national government.”).  For another example of a treaty that recognized 
tribal sovereignty in the confederation era, see, Treaty with the Six Nations, U.S.–Six Nations, Oct. 
22 1784, 7 Stat. 15, art. II (“The Oneida and Tuscarora nations shall be secured in the possession of 
the lands on which they are settled.”).  
 52. Robert J. Miller, American Indian Influence on the United States Constitution and its Framers, 
18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 133, 144 (1993) (“The United States Continental and Confederation 
Congresses concluded nine separate treaties with different tribes from 1778–1789.”).  It should be 
noted that although, as James Madison put it, the provision was largely “incomprehensible,” THE 
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cogently summarized the three main historical precedents that the Framers 
kept in mind while drafting the Constitution: 
(1) The Indian tribes were to be thought of as separate nations and 
dealt with by treaties arrived at by diplomatic relations according to 
precedents established by international law.  (2) As a separate 
nation, the internal affairs of an Indian tribe were the responsibility 
of the tribal authorities and were not supposed to be tampered with 
by the United States.  (3) As relations with Indian tribes were 
considered to be between nations, they were to be handled by the 
central government, and not by the States.53 
The recognition and existence of Indian tribal sovereignty is the historic 
backdrop from which the Framers drafted the Constitution.  It was, in other 
words, upon the antecedent historical practice, and the “experiences and the 
precedents established during the colonial period,” that “the United States 
would formulate her Indian policy” under the Constitution.54  Indeed, the 
language of what became the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause grandfathered 
 
FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 284, Article IX of the Articles of Confederation granted the Confederation 
Congress “the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs 
with Indians not members of any of the states; provided, that the legislative right of any state within 
its own limits be not infringed or violated.”  Articles of Confederation art. IX, para. 4 (emphasis 
added). Some have interpreted the managing all affairs with Indians language to imply that the 
Confederation Congress had close-to-plenary power over Indian tribal sovereignty.  Tyler, supra note 
47, at 34 (“By giving the central government power to manage affairs with ‘Indians not members of 
any of the States,’ it was recognized that western Indian affairs were to be placed under Federal 
control.”); see also Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and 
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 199 (1984) (noting that “the Articles of Confederation contained 
a general power over Indian affairs”).  The current Constitution, however, “contains no provision 
allowing Congress to regulate Indian ‘affairs’ more generally.”  Maggs, Gregory E., A Concise Guide 
to the Articles of Confederation as a Source for Determining the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 
85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 397, 423 (2017).  Indeed, in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, Justice Thomas 
observed that at the Constitutional Convention, James Madison had proposed giving Congress the 
power to regulate “Indian affairs” but that the delegates did not adopt this proposal.  570 U.S. 637, 
663–664 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring).  The refusal to include the Articles of Confederation’s broad 
language led Justice Thomas to conclude that “the Framers of the Constitution were alert to the 
difference between the power to regulate trade with the Indians and the power to regulate all Indian 
affairs.  By limiting Congress’ power to the former, the Framers declined to grant Congress the same 
broad powers over Indian affairs conferred by the Articles of Confederation.”  Id. 
 53. Tyler, supra note 47, at 32. 
 54. Id.; see also Robert J. Miller, supra note 52, at 144 (“Consequently, the Continental Congress, 
the Confederation Congress, and the Framers of the Constitution of 1787 were accustomed to dealing 
with tribes and were familiar with Indian practices and government.”).  
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in treaties made even before the document’s ratification.55  The Framers’ 
decision to recognize the validity of treaties made before 1787 is just another 
indication of the Constitution’s acknowledgement of Indian tribes’ inherent 
sovereign immunity.  With this historical perspective in mind, Part III exposes 
the Indian plenary power doctrine as both atextual and ahistorical, ultimately 
joining with others who have questioned the doctrine’s correctness as an 
original matter. 
III. THE DUBIOUS ORIGINAL CORRECTNESS OF THE INDIAN PLENARY 
POWER DOCTRINE 
From 1789 to 1871, the federal government negotiated with Indian tribes 
to obtain the voluntary abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity.56  The 
Supreme Court, in a sharp, historic rupture, undermined the need for such 
bilateral negotiations in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.57  Justice Edward White 
reframed this extensive history as instead an exercise of Congress’s “[p]lenary 
authority over the tribal relations of the Indians, [which] has been exercised 
 
 55. The Supremacy Clause states that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority 
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).  At the Convention, Madison proposed the change from 
“all treaties made” under the authority of the United States to “treaties made, or which shall be made,” 
under authority of the United States.  MAX FARRAND, 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787, at 417 (1911) (referring to Madison’s Notes from August 25, 1787).  In Madison’s words, 
the “insertion was meant to obviate all doubt concerning the force of treaties preexisting, by making 
the words ‘all treaties made’ to refer to them, as the words inserted would refer to future treaties.”  Id.; 
see also C.H. McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States, 42 MINN. L. REV. 709, 
730 (1958) (“These changes show how it came about that article VI, clause 2, refers to laws made in 
pursuance of the Constitution, but to treaties made or to be made under the authority of the United 
States.”); id. at 731 (“With respect to treaties the retention of the phrase ‘under the authority of the 
United States’ was evidently intended to include treaties made before the Constitution, a point on 
which Madison’s amendment was intended merely ‘to obviate all doubt.’”). 
 56. Miller, supra note 33, at 46 (“Ultimately, the United States entered 366 (or more) treaties with 
Indian nations from 1789–1871.  These treaties were entered after extensive negotiations and 
consultations and only with the consent of the tribal governments.”). 
 57. 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).  I should note that United States v. Kagama, decided more than a 
decade before Lone Wolf, is recognized as the first precedent that established Congress’s plenary 
power to pass all manner of statutes regarding Indian tribes.  Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1886) 
(acknowledging congressional plenary power doctrine).  In that case, the Court grounded the Indian 
plenary power doctrine “not so much from the clause in the Constitution . . . as from . . . the right of 
exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the National Government, and can be found nowhere else.”  
Id. at 380. 
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by Congress from the beginning.”58  By recharacterizing Congress’s power as 
plenary, the Lone Wolf Court “implied that, while the United States’ 
relationship with tribes developed through mutual negotiation, these 
negotiations were merely an exercise of Congress’ absolute power over 
tribes.”59  Congress’s inherent authority to govern Indians solely by legislation 
was said to put all Indian matters “within the domain of the legislative 
authority, and its action is conclusive upon the courts.”60 
The consequence of Lone Wolf’s historical recharacterization—and the 
doctrinal progeny which it has since spawned—is that Congress enjoys a 
judicially manufactured plenary power granting “virtually unlimited authority 
to regulate tribes.”61  No longer does the federal government need to take a 
seat at the table and negotiate with Indian tribes to convince these sovereign 
nations to willingly surrender their inherent immunity.  Instead, satisfaction 
of the lesser constitutional hurdle of bicameralism and presentment is today 
sufficient to abrogate the immunity of Indian tribes.  The introduction of the 
Indian plenary power doctrine in the late nineteenth century thus transformed 
the historic practice of treaty-making which hitherto bridged relations 
between the United States and Indian tribes.62  With the advent of the doctrine, 
tribal immunity has since become “conditional, premised on the more absolute 
sovereignty of the United States.”63 
Today, courts and scholars proffer a variety of justifications in defense of 
 
 58. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).  
 59. Anna Sappington, Is Lara the Answer to Implicit Divestiture? A Critical Analysis of the 
Congressional Delegation Exception, 7 WYO. L. REV. 149, 157 (2007).  
 60. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903). 
 61. Steele, supra note 29, at 670; see also Philip J. Prygoski, War as the Prevailing Metaphor in 
Federal Indian Law Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Judicial Activism, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 491, 
520 (1997) (noting that the Indian plenary power doctrine has given “Congress an absolute, unchecked 
power to regulate all affairs with the Indians.”); Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 
154 (1980) (“[T]ribal sovereignty . . . [is] subordinate to, only the Federal government, not the States”); 
Corina Rocha Pandeli, When the Chips are Down: Do Indian Tribes with Insolvent Gaming 
Operations Have the Ability to File for Bankruptcy Under the Federal Bankruptcy Code?, 2 UNLV 
GAMING L. J. 255, 257 (2011) (“Early Supreme Court cases took the basis for Indian sovereignty 
provided for in the U.S. Constitution and defined the legal parameters of such sovereignty.”).  
 62. See Philip M. Kannan, Reinstating Treaty-Making with Native American Tribes, 16 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 809 (2008) (examining the United States’ use of treaties to regulate affairs with 
Indian tribes throughout most the of nineteenth century); Barrett, supra note 21, at 152 (“Treaty 
making with the Indians ceased in 1871 in response to demands from the House of Representatives 
for a role in the making of federal Indian policy.  Thereafter, relations between the United States and 
Indian tribes were governed by statute.”); Miller, supra note 33, at 47 (“In 1871, Congress ended treaty 
making with tribes.”). 
 63. United States–Crow Treaty, supra note 15, at 407. 
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the Indian plenary power doctrine.64  But others, Justice Thomas specifically, 
have challenged the original correctness of the doctrine.65  An examination of 
the Constitutional text, its original meaning, and the inadequacy of arguments 
in support of the doctrine demonstrate why the Indian plenary power doctrine 
has roundly, and rightly, been criticized.66 
The Constitution of 1789 mentions Indians twice.67  Article I, Section 2 
states that “Indians not taxed” are excluded from both congressional and tax 
apportionment.68  Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian tribes.”69  The Framers’ creation of a government of limited powers 
extended even to “Indians, by limiting Congress’s purview [only] ‘to regulate 
commerce with . . . Indian tribes.”‘70  The Indian Commerce Clause, as it is 
often called, “does not confer upon Congress complete power over Indian 
 
 64. Steele, supra note 29, at 681 (discussing proffered justifications).  
 65. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2569 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(challenging the original correctness of the Indian plenary power doctrine); see also Robert N. Clinton, 
There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 117 (2002) 
(“[P]lenary power doctrine first emerged to rationalize late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century 
efforts by Congress to assert colonial hegemony over Indian peoples in Indian country without their 
consent . . . .  [T]hese claims had no basis in the text, history, or theory of the United States 
Constitution.”). 
 66. Hillary M. Hoffman, Congressional Plenary Power and Indigenous Environmental 
Stewardship: The Limits of Environmental Federalism, 97 OR. L. REV. 353, 354 (2019) (“Despite the 
lack of a strong constitutional foundation, over time, Congress encroached deeper into matters 
affecting indigenous nations and indigenous peoples.”). 
 67. Conway, supra note 28, at 1351 (“The Constitution makes only a few references to Indians or 
Indian tribes, so caution is necessary when attempting to locate an explicit constitutional source of 
federal power over Indian affairs.”). 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added).  The same provision also appears in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers 
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary 
Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 26 (2002) (“Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment 
both exempt ‘Indians not taxed’ from population enumerations for congressional apportionment, 
suggesting either that Indians are non-members or are separate sovereigns free from most 
congressional control.”).  This Article does not discuss the Apportionment Clause in depth because it 
is not a source of federal power, but merely a description of how to apportion taxes and representation.  
Sorenson, supra note 39, at 99 (noting that the “Indians not taxed” clause is a constitutional 
acknowledgment that Native American tribes owed allegiance to a sovereign other than the United 
States and its several states).  
 69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added); see also Conway, supra note 28, at 1352 (“The 
Indian Commerce Clause originated from the tensions between state and federal power that developed 
during the confederation period.”). 
 70. Taylor Ledford, Foundations of Sand: Justice Thomas’s Critique of the Indian Plenary Power 
Doctrine, 43 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 167, 173 (2018) (alteration in original). 
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tribes,” but instead grants Congress only the power to regulate commerce with 
the Indian tribes.71  To put it differently, the Indian Commerce Clause “did 
not grant to Congress a police power over the Indians, nor a general power to 
otherwise intervene in tribal affairs.”72  The modern Supreme Court, however, 
has partly tethered Congress’s broad authority to abrogate Tribal immunity 
upon the Indian Commerce Clause’s rather narrow language.73 
As a matter of basic logic, the Indian Commerce Clause cannot possibly 
provide the textual hook to uphold congressional plenary lawmaking power 
over Indian tribes.74  Indeed, it is well understood that Congress cannot use 
the Commerce Clause power to abrogate state sovereign immunity.75  There 
is no persuasive justification to treat Indian tribes differently.  In fact, both 
states and Indian tribes enjoy express textual mention in the Clause itself.  
Defending the Indian plenary power doctrine based on the Indian Commerce 
Clause, would also suggest that Congress enjoys a plenary power over all 
foreign nations.76  The more natural understanding is that the Clause 
“solidifies the direct relationship between Indian nations and the Federal 
government and recognizes their sovereignty as derived from a source other 
than the Constitution.”77  The language “with the Indian tribes” also offers a 
 
 71. Prakash, supra note 15, at 1081. 
 72. Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 201, 265 (2007). 
 73. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (noting that “the central 
function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the 
field of Indian affairs”); see also Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985) (noting that 
“[t]he Constitution vests . . . Federal Government with exclusive authority over relations with Indian 
tribes.”); Miller, supra note 52, at 154 (“The new Constitution and this clause made it clear that the 
federal government would regulate Indian affairs.”). 
 74. Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the 
United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 
617, 640 (1994) (“[T]he ‘Indian Commerce Clause’ alone is not a source of Union power over the 
tribes. Such Union power requires the Treaty Clause and a treaty upon which to hang an inter-
sovereign relationship.”). 
 75. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot, when acting 
pursuant to its legislative powers under Article I of the Constitution, abrogate the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity); accord City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (placing 
limits on Congress’s power to abrogate a states’ sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 76. Prakash, supra note 15, at 1087–88. 
 77. Hoover, supra note 8, at 272–73.  In his concurrence in United State v. Lara, Justice Thomas 
expressed his disbelief over attempts to rest the Indian plenary power doctrine on the Indian Commerce 
Clause.  541 U.S. 193 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).  In his view, the “Federal Government cannot 
simultaneously claim power to regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes through ordinary domestic 
legislation and also maintain that the tribes possess anything resembling ‘sovereignty.’”  Id. at 225 
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persuasive clue that the Framers understood the tribes as neither subordinate 
nor conquered peoples.78  The text indicates that Framers recognized the 
Indian tribes as distinct entities.79  Just as Congress does not “hide elephants 
in mouseholes,”80 neither did the Framers conceal broad grants of plenary 
power in specific grants of particularized authority.81  According to Professor 
Robert S. Clinton, Indian tribes “inclusion in the Commerce Clause with two 
other sovereigns, foreign nations and the states, whose political existence the 
United States also had no power to destroy, reflects that conception of the 
power.”82 
The other textual source that recognizes the federal government’s 
relationship with tribes is the Treaty Clause, “which indisputably includes the 
power to enter into treaties with tribes even though it does not mention them 
specifically.”83  Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 vests the President—
importantly not Congress—with the “Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties.”84  Only the President can exercise 
the treaty power with sovereign entities.  The Senate simply either rejects or 
ratifies the agreed upon treaty.85 
The Treaty Power, like the Indian Commerce Clause, seems an imprudent 
 
(citation omitted).  He also believed that the original understanding of the Clause cut against Congress’ 
claim to plenary power over Indian Tribes.  Id. at 229–31. 
 78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 
 79. Krakoff, supra note 2, at 529.  
 80. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).  
 81. Hoffman, supra note 66, at 378 (noting that “the plain text of the Indian Commerce Clause—
which is the most cited constitutional basis for congressional plenary power—does not support 
legislative efforts in matters affecting indigenous nations, their members, and their lands”). 
 82. Clinton, supra note 65, at 147. 
 83. Krakoff, supra note 2, at 529; see also id. at 497 n.24 (“The Treaty Clause does not mention 
Indian tribes specifically, but there is no dispute that the power includes treatymaking with tribes.”); 
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 4th 239, 249 (2006) (citation 
omitted) (“The treaty clause of the federal Constitution has been recognized in some cases as another 
potential source of plenary federal authority over Indian tribes.”); Sorenson, supra note 39, at 98 
(positing that “the notion that the United States should deal with tribes as sovereign entities and respect 
their sovereign powers was nevertheless written into American law from its founding”). 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; It is worth mentioning that Article I Section 10 Clause 1 forbids 
states from “enter[ing] into any Treaty.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  The power is thus vested in 
the federal government—and more specifically, the President alone.  
 85. Justice Thomas recently stressed this point, arguing that because Article II vests authority in 
the President to make treaties it thereby largely excises Congress from participation.  See United States 
v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).  He also rebuked the majority in that case for 
holding that the treaty power granted Congress a “free-floating power to legislate as it sees fit on topics 
that could potentially implicate some unspecified treaty.”  Id. at 225. 
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textual foundation on which to rest Congress’s purported plenary authority to 
abrogate tribal immunity.  The Treaty Power authorizes the President alone to 
negotiate bilateral and multilateral treaties with willing Indian tribes.86  The 
treaty mechanism thus appears directed toward protecting “tribes from 
arbitrary assumption of federal power, for a tribe had to agree to a treaty.”87  
As the Supreme Court has even noted, the “treaty power does not literally 
authorize Congress to act legislatively, for it is an Article II power authorizing 
the President, not Congress, ‘to make Treaties.’”88  Seen in this light, the 
Treaty Clause taken together with the Indian Commerce Clause, “provide two 
constitutional bases for sovereign-to-sovereign relations between the United 
States and Indian nations.”89  They both undercut—rather than support—the 
Indian plenary power doctrine. 
The Constitution, as both of these clauses show, clearly contemplates the 
federal government dealing with the various Indian nations “on a tribe-by-
tribe basis.”90  Viewed with the extensive history of treatymaking between 
European and Indian peoples in mind, it is clear that “treaties presumed that 
Native American tribes were independent and sovereign; being independent 
and sovereign, the Constitution could not confer upon the national 
 
 86. Throughout the republic’s first century, the President freely wielded the treaty power to 
negotiate with Indian tribes.  See Hoffman, supra note 66, at 362 (“During the first 100 years of United 
States history, if the federal government sought to remove a tribe or otherwise regulate an internal 
tribal matter, this was generally accomplished using the Treaty Power and left to the executive branch 
to negotiate.”); see also Pearl, supra note 18, at 300 (“Treaty making continued well into the mid-
nineteenth century until Congress passed the Indian Appropriations Act in 1871, which prohibited the 
President from negotiating treaties and agreements with Indian tribes.”).  Congress certainly possesses 
the power to pass treaty implementing legislation with tribes and to regulate American citizens and 
their ability to engage in trade with the tribes.  Originally understood, however, congressional authority 
did not extend to matters internal to the tribes. 
 87. Natelson, supra note 72, at 266; see also Mark R. Carter, Congress’ Encroachment on the 
President’s Power in Indian Law and its Effect on Executive-Order Reservations, 11 SEATTLE J. SOC. 
JUST. 1193, 1204 (2013) (discussing some of the earliest treaties President Washington entered into 
with Indian tribes).  
 88. Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (2004) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2). 
 89. Riley, Native Nations, supra note 35, at 179; see also Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: 
Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 691 (1989) (noting that based 
on the Constitution’s text, “Indian tribes are treated as entities with whom to have commerce and to 
make treaties”).  Justice Thomas’s original understanding of the Constitution supports the conclusion 
that “neither the Treaty Clause nor the Indian Commerce Clause empowers Congress to decide Indian 
tribal sovereignty’s scope.”  Carter, supra note 87, at 1197.  
 90. Ledford, supra note 70, at 202; see also Seielstad, supra note 27, at 685 (noting that in the 
Republic’s early years, “[h]undreds of treaties were entered into with tribes by the United States 
government”). 
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government any domestic power over them.”91  Even though the textual and 
logical arguments to the contrary seem insurmountable, “the Supreme Court 
has held that Treaty Clause authority, combined with authority in the Indian 
Commerce Clause, gives Congress ‘plenary and exclusive’ powers to legislate 
‘in respect to Indian tribes.’”92 
Analysis of the Framers’ deliberations during the Convention also reveals 
that the original understanding of congressional power over Indian tribes was 
limited to the document’s enumerated powers.93  The Framers hotly debated 
the scope of congressional power in the area of tribal sovereignty leading up 
to and during the Constitutional Convention.94  Professor Gregory Ablavsky’s 
recent article captures the Madisonian and the Hamiltonian perspectives on 
Indian peoples.  Although the two perspectives maintained a fair share of 
differences, both recognized the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes.95  At 
the Constitutional Convention, moreover, it was Madison who “proposed the 
Constitution’s less ambiguous Indian Commerce Clause to grant power to the 
federal government to negotiate with tribes.”96  His proposal withstood other 
delegates’ preference for inclusion of “exclusive congressional jurisdiction 
over all Indian affairs.”97  The Convention’s rejection of such an exclusive 
power implies that the Framers did not wish to grant Congress plenary power 
to abrogate Tribal sovereignty.  The Framers instead “deliberately took a 
 
 91. Mark Savage, Native Americans and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 16 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 57, 113 (1991); see also Pearl, supra note 18, at 300 (noting that in the early years of 
the Republic, “[t]reaties were the primary mechanism by which the national government dealt with 
Indian tribes.”); Hall, supra note 5, at 499 (explaining that the treaty power “was the chief means for 
dealing with the Indians in the early years”).  The general view of tribal sovereignty is captured by 
one episode in which Secretary Henry Knox reported to President Washington that “[t]he Indians 
being the prior occupants, possess the right of the soil.  It cannot be taken from them unless by their 
free consent, or by the right of conquest in case of a just war.  To dispossess them on any other principle 
would be a gross violation of the fundamental laws of nature and of that distributive justice which is 
the glory of a nation.”  GEORGE DEWEY HARMON, SIXTY YEARS OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 55 (1941). 
 92. Hoffman, supra note 66, at 359. 
 93. Savage, supra note 91, at 72–78 (observing that the Framers neither discussed a congressional 
plenary power over Indian tribes nor suggested that the War, Property, or Treaty clauses granted such 
a power). 
 94. Hoffman, supra note 66, at 359. 
 95. See generally Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L. J. 999 (2014) 
(discussing the competing perspectives while also acknowledging that both views recognized the 
inherent sovereign immunity of Indian tribes); see also Miller, supra note 52, at 135 (“Many Framers 
were familiar with Indian culture through serving as Indian commissioners for their states or the 
Continental Congress, and as Indian treaty negotiators.”). 
 96. Carter, supra note 87, at 1204 (emphasis added). 
 97. Natelson, supra note 72, at 228 (emphasis added). 
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general police power out of the Constitution and chose instead to limit 
Congress’s authority to” regulate commerce with the tribes.98 
Further, historian Mark Savage’s thorough examination of the Framers’ 
original understanding of Indian tribes led him to conclude that the Framers 
did not envision the federal government acting as a “sovereign over Native 
Americans.”99  As Indian tribes played a central role throughout the eighteenth 
century, they were far from a political afterthought during the Constitutional 
Convention.100  Indeed, while the Constitution was being drafted, “powerful 
Native nations owned and governed much of the territory mapmakers labeled 
‘United States.’”101  The vast territorial presence of the Indian tribes, 
combined with the Constitution’s “scant reference elsewhere to federal 
authority related to, much less over tribes,” shows that the Framers 
contemplated Indian tribes and the United States interacting as separate 
sovereigns with one another.102 
Professor Robert Clinton’s research likewise reveals that “the Framers 
generally accepted the notion that the Indian tribes constituted separate, 
sovereign peoples who were totally self-governing within their territory and 
who relied on the federal government solely for external relations, i.e., 
diplomatic representation with foreign governments and protection from 
foreign foes and citizens of the United States.”103  Comprehensive 
congressional power over indigenous peoples is simply not what the Framers 
envisioned.104  Instead, the Framers “regarded Indians as distinct nations to be 
dealt with diplomatically and at arm’s length.”105 
 
 98. Hoffman, supra note 66, at 379 (emphasis in original); see also FRANCIS JENNINGS, EMPIRE 
OF FORTUNE 88 (1988) (noting that Benjamin Franklin wrote that “[s]ecuring the Friendship of the 
Indians is of the greatest Consequence to these Colonies”).  
 99. Savage, supra note 91, at 88 n.124; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, at 163 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (“The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our neighborhood . . . encircle 
the Union from Maine to Georgia.”).  
 100. See generally Savage, supra note 91 (explaining the central role of Indian tribes throughout 
the era).  
 101. Ablavsky, supra note 95, at 1003–04.  
 102. Hoffman, supra note 66, at 359 (emphasis in original). 
 103. Clinton, supra note 65, at 147; see also Newton, supra note 52, at 200 (“The absence of a 
general power over Indian affairs in the Constitution is not surprising to students of history, for at the 
time the Constitution was drafted, the framers regarded Indian tribes as sovereign nations.”). 
 104. Hoffman, supra note 66, at 358. 
 105. Prakash, supra note 15, at 1080 (“Although Congress might be able to regulate commerce with 
the tribes on a unilateral basis (in the same way it could regulate commerce with other nations on a 
unilateral basis), diplomacy—principally treaties—generally would regulate the relationship.  None 
of the Founders envisioned that the federal government—a government of enumerated powers—
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Indian tribes were also not participants at either the Constitutional 
Convention or the ratifying debates.  The Framers “did not invite American 
Indian nations (or tribes) to the Constitutional Convention, nor did they ask 
Indian nations to ratify the Constitution.”106  Indian tribes “played no role in 
selecting or designing the governance structure of the United States.”107  The 
Indian plenary power doctrine thus grants Congress the authority to abrogate 
the immunity of separate sovereigns despite their lack of involvement in either 
the drafting or the ratification of the Constitution.  The Court has recognized 
that “it would be absurd to suggest that the tribes surrendered immunity in a 
convention to which they were not even parties.”108 
The generation that framed and ratified the Constitution, and that 
generation’s immediate successors, widely understood that tribes enjoyed 
sovereign immunity subject to abrogation by voluntary treaties alone.  Indeed, 
for the United States’ first century of existence, the relationship between 
Indian tribes and the federal government was premised on negotiated treaties, 
rather than any superseding federal power over the sovereignty of the tribes.109  
The evidence from the Founding era is hard to square with the modern Indian 
plenary power doctrine.  The original and plain meaning of the Constitution’s 
text, moreover, indicates that “the national legislative power is limited to 
commerce with Native American tribes, and extends no farther.”110  
Congressional plenary power over the sovereign immunity of indigenous 




would enjoy a plenary power over all aspects of tribal life.”). 
 106. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 76 (2012); see also 
Sorenson, supra note 39, at 98 (“Absent, of course, from the Constitutional Convention, were 
representatives of tribes.”). 
 107. Hoffman, supra note 66, at 381 (“Congress’s exercise of expansive authority over indigenous 
nations does not adhere to the fundamental democratic principle that citizen participants validate 
governmental actions through consent.”). 
 108. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991); see also Hoffman, supra 
note 66, at 383 (“The Constitution should not govern peoples who did not take part in its development 
or adoption.”). 
 109. Clinton, supra note 65, at 145; see also GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY 
OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 123–32 (2009) (“Nothing preoccupied the Federalist 
[Washington] administration more than having to deal with . . . native peoples.”). 
 110. Savage, supra note 91, at 79; see also Miller, supra note 33, at 40 (“The political existence of 
the American Indian nations and their government-to-government relationship with the United States 
is expressly recognized in the U.S. Constitution.”). 
 111. Clinton, supra note 65, at 117.  
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IV. DOES “DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT” COVER INDIAN TRIBES? 
To fully understand the current circuit split on the question whether the 
term “domestic government” found in Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code 
unequivocally covers Indian tribes, it is important to situate the term in its 
statutory context.  Under Section 106, a federal bankruptcy court may “hear 
and determine any issue arising with respect to the application of [the Code] 
. . . to governmental units.”112  Should the bankruptcy court determine that the 
governmental unit is liable, the court may enter “an order, process, or 
judgment,” which includes “an order or judgment awarding a money 
recovery,” against that unit.113  The court may also enforce “any such order, 
process, or judgment against any governmental unit.”114  The term 
“governmental unit,” as previously mentioned, is defined to include “domestic 
government.”115  With the statutory context in mind, this Part examines the 
split over whether “domestic government” should be interpreted to abrogate 
the immunity of sovereign Indian tribes. 
The Ninth Circuit, representing one side of the split, reasoned that the 
plain and ordinary meaning of the Bankruptcy Code’s abrogating provision 
clearly covers Indian tribes because they are “domestic government[s],” and, 
as a result, “Congress ‘unequivocally expressed’ its intent to abrogate Indian 
tribes’ immunity.”116  Prior to reaching that conclusion, the Ninth Circuit 
made sure to explain that tribal “[i]mmunity from suit has been recognized by 
the courts of this country as integral to the sovereignty and self-governance of 
Indian tribes.”117  Looking at the text of the Code, however, the court 
determined that it was “clear from the face of §§ 106(a) and 101(27) that 
Congress did intend to abrogate the sovereign immunity of all ’foreign and 
domestic governments.’”118 
 
 112. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(2) (2012).  
 113. Id. at § 106(a)(3). 
 114. Id. at § 106(a)(4). 
 115. Id. at § 101(27). 
 116. Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004); see also In re 
Platinum Oil Properties, LLC, 465 B.R. 621, 643 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2011) (holding that domestic 
government “embodies Congress’ clear, and unequivocal abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity”); 
Russell v. Fort McDowell Yavapai Nation (In re Russell), 293 B.R. 34, 44 (Bankr. D.Ariz.2003) 
(holding that “[t]he term ‘other foreign or domestic government’ in § 101(27) unequivocally, and 
without implication, includes Indian tribes as ‘governmental units.”); Pandeli, supra note 61, at 273 
(discussing the Ninth Circuit’s decision).  
 117. Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1056. 
 118. Id. at 1057 (emphasis added). 
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Analogizing to state sovereign immunity, the court also pointed out that 
“Congress clearly does not have to list all of the specific states, beginning with 
Alabama and ending with Wyoming.”119  Congress can instead abrogate the 
immunity of “all states” in one-fell swoop.120  By using the phrase “other 
foreign or domestic governments,” Congress thus “effected a generic 
abrogation of sovereign immunity” that swept in all Indian tribes.121  Setting 
aside the argument that the general proscription against abrogation by 
implication requires Congress to specifically list each government, the court 
noted that Congress need not list each tribe by name. 
In addition to its textual rationale, the Ninth Circuit also concluded that 
domestic government “logically” must cover Indian tribes.122  Not only did 
the ordinary meaning of domestic government suggest the term was “all-
encompassing,”123 but application of a simple syllogism in the court’s view 
displaced any lingering doubt.  The court reasoned as follows: “Congress 
explicitly abrogated the immunity of any ’foreign or domestic government.’  
Indian tribes are domestic governments.  Therefore, Congress expressly 
abrogated the immunity of Indian tribes.”124  The combined logic of the 
syllogism and the common, ordinary meaning of domestic government, led 
the court to hold that “[n]o implication beyond the words of the statute is 
necessary to conclude that Congress ‘unequivocally expressed’ its intent to 
abrogate Indian tribes’ immunity.”125  Yet the court went a step further, 
asserting that Congress need not to “utter the magic words ‘Indian tribes’ 
when abrogating tribal sovereign immunity.”126 
 
 119. Id. at 1059. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id.  But see Greggory W. Dalton, Comment, A Failure of Expression: How the Provisions of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code Fail to Abrogate Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 81 WASH. L. REV. 645, 647 
(2006) (suggesting that phrases like “other foreign or domestic governments” historically have been 
deemed insufficient to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity). 
 122. Id. at 1057. 
 123. Id. at 1059. 
 124. Id. at 1058; see also In re Russell, 293 B.R. 34, 41 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003) (applying the notable 
syllogism of the “classic form—All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; hence Socrates is mortal—” to 
conclude that domestic government logically must cover Indian tribes).  
 125. Id. at 1060. 
 126. Id. at 1061 (emphasis added).  Summarizing other justifications for the Ninth Circuit’s holding, 
the Delaware bankruptcy court stated that the “the Ninth Circuit reasoned that: (i) the Supreme Court 
has referred to Indian tribes as ‘domestic dependent nations;’ (ii) Congress enacted sections 106 and 
101(27) with that reference in mind; (iii) Congress abrogated sovereign immunity as to states, foreign 
states, and other foreign or domestic governments; and, therefore (iv) Congress must have intended to 
include Indian tribes as “other foreign or domestic governments.”  In re Money Ctr. of Am., Inc., 565 
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In contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s approach, a divided panel of the Sixth 
Circuit recently held that Congress did not unequivocally abrogate tribal 
immunity by using the term “domestic government.”127  The majority began 
its analysis by reiterating that under the Supreme Court’s current doctrine, 
Congress must unequivocally express its intent to abrogate the sovereign 
immunity of Indian tribes in explicit legislation.128  The panel next described 
“unequivocal” as establishing a high bar—”‘[t]he term ‘unequivocal,’ taken 
by itself,’ means ‘admits no doubt.”‘129  That high bar, especially in the 
sensitive context of tribal sovereign immunity, supported a literal reading of 
unequivocal—requiring that for a statute “to abrogate tribal sovereign 
immunity, Congress must leave no doubt about its intent.”130  The majority 
nevertheless conceded that “[t]here cannot be reasonable debate that Indian 
tribes are both ‘domestic’ . . . and also that Indian tribes are fairly 
characterized as possessing attributes of a ‘government.’”131  The majority’s 
concession recognizes the logical force of the Ninth Circuit’s syllogism.  
According to the Sixth Circuit, however, the “real question is whether 
Congress—when it employed the phrase ‘other foreign or domestic 
government’—unequivocally expressed an intent to abrogate tribal sovereign 
immunity.”132  The supposition that Indian tribes qualify as “domestic 
governments does not lead to the conclusion that Congress unequivocally 
meant to include them when it employed the phrase ‘other foreign or domestic 
 
B.R. 87, 102 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017).  Other courts have also considered the issue and joined the Ninth 
Circuit’s side of the split.  See In re Platinum Oil Props., LLC, 465 B.R. 621, 643 (Bankr. D.N.M. 
2011) (“11 U.S.C. § 106 together with 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) embodies Congress’ clear and unequivocal 
abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity.”); In re Russell, 293 B.R. 34, 44 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003) 
(“‘[O]ther foreign or domestic government’ in § 101(27) unequivocally, and without implication, 
includes Indian tribes as ‘governmental units.’”); In re Vianese, 195 B.R. 572, 576 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 
1995) (tribes “comprise ‘governmental units’ within the meaning of Code § 101(27)”). 
 127. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 2019).  The district court below 
concluded that that it could not “say ‘with perfect confidence’ that Congress intended, by using the 
generic phrase ‘other domestic governments’ in § 101(27), to clearly, unequivocally, unmistakably 
and without ambiguity abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in § 106(a).”  In re Greektown Holdings, 
LLC, 532 B.R. 680, 684 (E.D. Mich. 2015), aff’d, 917 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 128. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).  
 129. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F.3d 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979) (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
(1961)); see also In re Russell, 293 B.R. 34, 38 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003) (“So according to the ‘plain 
meaning’ of ‘unequivocal,’ to be equivocal the statute purporting to abrogate sovereign immunity must 
be susceptible of an alternative interpretation that does not do so.”).  
 130. Id. at 457 (emphasis in original).  
 131. Id. at 459 (alteration in original).  
 132. Id. 
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government.’”133  The court was in search of greater specificity. 
The majority relied on Congress’s consistent historical practice of stating 
Indian tribes by name to abrogate their immunity.134  Instead of abrogating 
tribal immunity through reference to “governmental units,” which is defined 
to include a “domestic government,” the court posited that Congress could 
have just followed past practice and explicitly mentioned Indian tribes.135  The 
majority granted significant weight to the fact that “there is not one example 
in all of history where the Supreme Court has found that Congress intended 
to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity without expressly mentioning Indian 
tribes somewhere in the statute.”136  As “it is undisputed that no provision of 
the Bankruptcy Code mentions Indian tribes,” the court reasoned that it made 
historical sense to interpret domestic government not to abrogate tribal 
immunity as well.137  Pursuant to the expressio unius canon, the majority also 
asserted that Congress’s failure to explicitly mention Indian tribes, “after 
arguably mentioning every other sovereign by its specific name,” provided 
circumstantial evidence that Congress meant to exclude tribes from the 
statute’s coverage.138 
 
 133. Id. at 460 (citation omitted). 
 134. Id. at 459 (citation omitted). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 460 (citations omitted).  The court also reasoned that in the years immediately preceding 
Congress’s enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, several statutes included Indian tribes by name.  See 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(a)(1)(A), 6903(13), 6903(15) 
(authorizing suits against an “Indian tribe”); Safe Water Drinking Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-
9(i)(2)(A), 300f(10), 300f(12) (authorizing suits against an “Indian tribe”).  
 137. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F.3d at 461. 
 138. Id. at 462.  The graveness of determining the limits on tribal immunity also cautioned the 
majority to tread carefully when deciding whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to 
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.  Id.; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 
(1978) (“[A] proper respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress 
in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent.”).  
Joining the Sixth Circuit’s side of the split include: Sawczuk v. Thunderbird Entm’t Ctr., Inc. (In re 
Money Ctrs. of Am., Inc.), Civ. No. 17-319-RGA, No. AP 16-50410-CSS, 2018 WL 1535464, at *4 
(D. Del. Mar. 29, 2018) (“Section 101(27)’s reference to ‘other . . . domestic government[s]’ falls 
short of the clarity required for abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity.”) (alterations in original); see 
also id. at *3 (“Where the language of a federal statute does not include ‘Indian tribes’ in definitions 
of parties subject to suit or does not specifically assert jurisdiction over ‘Indian tribes,’ courts find the 
statute insufficient to express an unequivocal congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity.”  
(citation omitted)); In re Whitaker, 474 B.R. 687, 695 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2012) (“[I]n enacting § 106, 
Congress did not unequivocally express its intent by enacting legislation explicitly abrogating the 
sovereign immunity of tribes.”); In re Star Grp. Commc’ns, Inc., 568 B.R. 616, 622-25 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
2016) (following Whitaker); In re National Cattle Cong., 247 B.R. 259, 267 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000) 
(“The Code makes no specific mention of Indian tribes.”); In re Mayes, 294 B.R. 145, 148 n.10 (B.A.P. 
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Even though the majority was unwilling to interpret “domestic 
government” as evincing sufficient congressional intent to abrogate tribal 
immunity, the court made sure to note that “Congress need not use ‘magic 
words’ to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.”139  Instead, Congress need 
only “unequivocally express” that purpose, which it can do in certain 
circumstances without express mention of Indian tribes or a closely associated 
term.140  In a footnote, the majority suggested that “a statute stating that 
‘sovereign immunity is abrogated as to all parties who could otherwise claim 
sovereign immunity,’” might be sufficient to evince congressional intent to 
abrogate tribal immunity.141  The majority, therefore, did not “hold that 
specific reference to Indian tribes is in all instances required to abrogate tribal 
sovereign immunity.”142 
The dissent’s rationale in many ways echoed the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning.  After applying the traditional tools of statutory interpretation to 
the plain meaning of the language, the dissent concluded there existed 
sufficient evidence of congressional intent to “abrogate[] the sovereign 
immunity of any government, of any type, anywhere in the world.”143  What 
is more, the dissent reasoned that logic recognized that Indian tribes are both 
domestic—as they reside and exercise sovereign authority within the 
 
10th Cir. 2003) (noting that the inference that the term included Indian tribes as domestic dependent 
nations did not meet the requirement for abrogation of tribal sovereignty to be explicit).  
 139. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F.3d 451, 461 (6th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added).  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 461 n.10 (quoting Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 
2004)). 
 142. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F.3d 451, 461 (6th Cir. 2019).  Some courts have 
indicated that specific reference to Indian tribes may be a prerequisite before finding the statute 
abrogates a tribe’s sovereign immunity.  See In re Star Grp. Commc’ns, Inc., 568 B.R. 616, 625 
(Bankr. D.N.J. 2016) (“If Congress had intended to abrogate sovereign immunity to Indian tribes under 
section 106, it could easily and expressly have done so, but it did not.”); In re Nat’l Cattle Cong., 247 
B.R. 259, 267 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000) (“The Code makes no specific mention of Indian tribes.  
Unlike States and foreign governments, Indian tribes are not specifically included in the § 101(27) 
definition of ‘governmental unit.’  In order to conclude Congress intended to subject Indian tribes to 
suit under the Code, the Court would need to infer such intent from language which does not 
unequivocally and unambiguously apply to Indian tribes.  Considering the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncements on tribal sovereign immunity, such an inference is inappropriate.”); Confederated 
Tribe of Colville Reservation Tribal Credit v. White (In re White), No. 96–CS–247, 1996 WL 
33407856, at *3 (E.D. Wash. 1996) (“There is no express mention of Indian tribes anywhere in the 
Bankruptcy Code, and the Court could only infer that an Indian tribe is a ‘domestic government’ under 
the definition of governmental unit. For these reasons, the Court concludes that Congress has not 
unequivocally expressed clear legislative intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity pursuant to the 
Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 143. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F.3d at 467 (Zouhary, J. dissenting).  
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territorial borders of the United States—and constitute a form of 
government—as they exercise political authority over and on behalf of tribal 
members.144  This reasoning coupled with “clear textual evidence of 
congressional intent,” was, like the Ninth Circuit had done, translated into a 
“simple syllogism: Sovereign immunity is abrogated as to all governments.  
Indian tribes are governments.  Hence sovereign immunity is abrogated as to 
Indian tribes.”145 
Also undergirding the dissent’s analysis was Supreme Court precedent 
cautioning against a requirement that congressional intent be stated in a 
“particular way” using specific “magic words.”146  The dissent thus took aim 
at the majority’s conclusion, equating it to a magic word requirement.  In the 
dissent’s view, the task is “not to hold Congress to a standard of speaking as 
precisely as it possibly can or to demand that it use the same words today as 
it has in the past,” but instead Congress’s language need just clearly subject 
the sovereign to suit to abrogate the tribe’s immunity.147  The fact that the 
plain and logical meaning of domestic government covers Indian tribes was 
sufficient for the dissent to conclude that Congress unequivocally evinced an 
intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. 
As a matter of pure statutory interpretation, wholly removed from the 
Indian tribal context, the Ninth Circuit majority and the Sixth Circuit’s 
dissenting judge appear to have the better of the two arguments.148  The 
Bankruptcy Code plainly “abrogate[s]” the “sovereign immunity” of a 
“governmental unit.”149  The Code defines a “governmental unit” to include a 
“domestic government.”150  Both the Sixth and the Ninth Circuits agree that 
the Indian tribes unquestionably qualify as governments, and domestic ones 
to boot.151  Based on the simple reasoning that (1) Congress abrogated (2) the 
 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. at 468. 
 146. FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 291 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 147. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F.3d at 470 (Zouhary, J. dissenting). 
 148. See Bevilacqua, supra note 2, at II.–171 (noting that “the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ logic 
that Indian tribes could fit within the definition of ‘governmental units’ under the Bankruptcy Code is 
reasonable.”).  
 149. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2012). 
 150. Id. at § 101(27). 
 151. Indian tribes fit that definition because they “exercise ‘inherent sovereign authority’” on behalf 
of their members.   Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014) (quoting Okla. Tax 
Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991)).  Likewise, as 
previously mentioned, the Ninth Circuit explained that “logically, there is no other form of government 
outside the foreign/domestic dichotomy.”  Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1057 
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sovereign immunity of domestic governments (3) which commonsensically 
must include Indian tribes, it seems clear that Congress intended to abrogate 
the Indian tribes’ sovereign immunity.  Under current doctrine, congressional 
intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity need only “be clearly discernable 
from the statutory text in light of traditional interpretive tools.”152 
Interpreting domestic government to not cover Indian tribes would also 
violate a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation: a statutory provision should 
not be construed “to have no consequence.”153  As the term “domestic 
government” cannot plausibly be read to include a governmental unit already 
listed in Section 101(27), interpreting “domestic government” to exclude 
Indian tribes would render the statutory term superfluous.154  Although 
“domestic government” is a broad term, the Supreme Court has made clear 
that “[b]road general language is not necessarily ambiguous when 
congressional objectives require broad terms.”155  “Domestic government” is 
thus not necessarily ambiguous.  Indeed, given the far-reaching scope of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the term “domestic government” is not ambiguous; it is 
simply a broad category.  The application of basic first-principles of statutory 
interpretation demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit likely failed to properly 
interpret the term “domestic government” to cover Indian tribes. 
Despite the persuasive statutory arguments in favor of interpreting 
domestic government to cover Indian tribes, this Article contends that the 
 
(9th Cir. 2004); see also Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (“in some 
respects,” tribes “are more like States than foreign sovereigns . . . [t]hey are, for example, domestic”).  
 152. FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 291 (2012).  If the term domestic government is considered 
ambiguous, the Indian canon would trigger, and the term would be construed in favor of the Indian 
tribes.  See Wildenthal, supra note 5, at 102 (noting that courts are to “construe treaties, statutes, and 
other sources of law liberally in favor of Indians, so as to resolve any ambiguities or uncertainties in 
their favor (the ‘ambiguity canon’).”); see also County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of 
the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992) (Scalia, J.) (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 
471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (“When we are faced with . . . two possible constructions, our choice between 
them must be dictated by a principle deeply rooted in this Court’s Indian jurisprudence: ‘[S]tatutes are 
to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their 
benefit.”’); Hall, supra note 5, at 520 (noting that Choate v. Trapp, 224 US 665 was “the first case to 
formally extend the Indian law canons to the interpretations of statutes”).  The main purpose of the 
Indian canon is to ensure “that Congress does not lightly or inadvertently terminate the sovereign 
rights of Indians.”  Hall, supra note 5, at 542.  Even though neither the Sixth Circuit nor Ninth Circuit 
discussed the Indian canon of construction in much detail, I am persuaded that the canon should not 
apply in this situation because as a matter of both logic and statutory context domestic government is 
not an ambiguous term.  
 153. Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 969 (2019) (internal citation omitted). 
 154. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27). 
 155. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980). 
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dubious original correctness of the Indian plenary power doctrine should 
trump the Ninth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit dissent’s compelling statutory 
justifications.156  Part V explains why a magic words clear statement rule 
should govern the question whether a statute has abrogated tribunal sovereign 
immunity. 
V. DOUBTFUL PLENARY POWER AUTHORITY WARRANTS A MAGIC WORDS 
CLEAR STATEMENT RULE 
The purpose of clear statement rules is for courts to “treat all statutes as 
maintaining the status quo unless Congress clearly states its contrary intention 
in the text of the statute.”157  As aforementioned, the well-established principle 
of avoiding unconstitutionality also cautions courts from interpreting a statute 
to be unconstitutional unless Congress has made its intent absolutely clear.158  
Such rules and principles are of course meaningless unless they compel courts 
“to choose an interpretation other than the one that it regards as the best or 
most probable reading of the statute.”159  Yet despite creating “an extensive 
regime of clear statement rules,”160 courts have admittedly vacillated about 
the level of textual precision to satisfy them.161  Under some circumstances, 
broad general language will often suffice.162  In other situations, however, 
 
 156. For a different rationale about why the Sixth Circuit has taken the correct position on the 
question, see Bevilacqua, supra note 2, at II.–168 (“The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding 
in In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III that the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code does not abrogate 
tribal immunity is consistent with the historical treatment and policy goals of providing immunity to 
Indian tribes.”). 
 157. Nagle, supra note 18, at 772; see also Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 
141 (2005) (noting that “a clear statement rule that implies a special substantive limit on the application 
of an otherwise unambiguous mandate”). 
 158. See supra note 21.  
 159. John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 425 
(2015); Barrett, supra note 21, at 167 (“[C]lear statement rules function no differently from other 
canons that permit a court to forsake a more natural interpretation in favor of a less natural one that 
protects a particular value.”). 
 160. Manning, supra note 159, at 401. 
 161. Nagle, supra note 18, at 803 (noting the distinction “between clear statement rules that can be 
satisfied by evidence outside the statutory text and despite plausible alternative readings of the text, 
and ‘super-strong’ clear statement rules that can only be satisfied by a specific statement in the 
statutory text”). 
 162. Id. at 772; see also Brian G. Slocum, Canons, the Plenary Power Doctrine, and Immigration 
Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 363, 370 n.31 (2014) (“The trigger for any substantive canon is something 
less than statutory clarity, but canons are not all triggered by the same level of uncertainty. Clear 
statement canons, for example, are triggered by less statutory ambiguity than are tie-breaker canons.”).  
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precision is a prerequisite, and Congress must use specific, targeted 
language.163  A particularly strong clear statement rule may even require the 
use of “magic words.”164  Many scholars term the latter version a super-strong 
clear-statement rule,165 which establishes a presumption that Congress may 
rebut only through unambiguous statutory text targeted at the specific 
problem.166  This Article acknowledges that many scholars have not been kind 
to the Supreme Court’s insistence upon clear statement rules to abrogate state, 
federal, and Indian sovereign immunity.167  The Court has also generally 
 
 163. Nagle, supra note 18, at 772. 
 164. BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A THEORY OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE 
OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 177 (2015); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILLIP P. FRICKLEY & 
ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 354–55 (2d ed. 2006) 
(“Sometimes the courts impose such a stringent requirement of statutory textual clarity as to require 
the legislature to draft statutes with highly targeted text containing what amounts to ‘magic language’ 
if the legislature wishes to overcome the canon.”); Canadian Lumber Trade All.  v. United States, 425 
F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1328 n.12 (Ct. Intl. Trade 2006) (“A ‘magic words’ rule, also referred to as a 
‘magical password,’ ‘express-reference’ or ‘express-statement’ rule, is a strict clear statement rule 
which requires the use of certain words to signal a particular Congressional intent.”); Dan Meagher, 
The Principle of Legality and a Common Law Bill of Rights—Clear Statement Rules Head Down 
Under, 42 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 65, 67–68 (2016) (“The methodology of clear statement rules—which 
require unmistakably clear statutory language (‘magic language’) to curtail or abrogate fundamental 
human rights—underpins this refashioned canon.”). 
 165. Justice Scalia has justified something close to a super-strong clear-statement rule based largely 
on the rule’s historical use.  In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, for instance, he argued that American 
“jurisprudence abounds with rules of ‘plain statement,’ ‘clear statement,’ and ‘narrow construction’ 
designed . . . to ensure that, absent unambiguous evidence of Congress’s intent, extraordinary 
constitutional powers are not invoked, or important constitutional protections eliminated, or seemingly 
inequitable doctrines applied.”  505 U.S. 504, 546 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part).  In the abrogation of sovereign immunity context, he has also made it clear 
that “since congressional elimination of state sovereign immunity is such an extraordinary act, one 
would normally expect it to be explicitly decreed rather than offhandedly implied—so something like 
a ‘clear statement’ rule is merely normal interpretation.”  Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a 
Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, 
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 29 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).  
Clear statement rules, if adopted for non-prudential reasons, thus appear to conform with textualist 
and originalist-based approaches to interpretation.  
 166. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules 
as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 611-12 (1992); see also Nicholas R. Bednar, 
The Clear-Statement Chevron Canon, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 819, 836 (2017) (“For simplicity, scholars 
generally place substantive canons in two categories: tiebreakers (weak) and clear-statement rules 
(strong).”).  
 167. Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking 
about Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 158 (2004) (“The difficulty with 
the clear statement rule is that it sharply restricts courts’ power to interpret constitutionally-inspired 
federal lawmaking flexibly so as to fulfill constitutional values.”).  I should note that Judge Amy 
Coney Barrett has argued that the application of clear statement rules in the sovereign immunity 
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repudiated the need for particular statutory labels, often employing the phrase 
“magic words” disparagingly.168  Yet the Court has recognized that the 
“standard principles of statutory construction do not have their usual force in 
cases involving Indian law.”169  The Indian tribal sovereign immunity context 
is simply one that is both different in degree and kind. 
A magic words clear statement rule in the Indian tribal sovereign 
immunity context would not be premised on prudential or normative values.  
The rule instead would rest on the dubious proposition that Congress 
possesses the constitutional authority to abrogate Indian tribal sovereign 
immunity as an original matter.  Establishing clear statement rules on 
constitutional principle has received some scholarly support.  Professor John 
Nagle, for instance, has argued that when “the Court has decided not to 
enforce fully a constitutional command through judicial review, then a clear 
statement rule with respect to statutes that may violate that command is 
justified.”170  Professor John Manning has likewise suggested that “[i]n areas 
in which the Court has pervasive doubts about its ability to recover firm 
constitutional meaning, perhaps clear statement rules do provide a gentler 
alternative to Marbury-style judicial review.”171  This logic should be applied 
to the Indian tribal sovereign immunity context.  If the Court has constitutional 
doubt about Congress’s authority to accomplish a statutory end, then the Court 
should make it especially cumbersome for Congress to achieve that 
constitutionally questionable goal.172  Congress must therefore be 
 
context is best understood as “a conscious application of a time-honored rule of sovereign exemption 
to a new kind of incursion on sovereignty.”  Barrett, supra note 21, at 150.  She has also posited that 
the clear-statement-sovereignty rule is “the starkest example of early courts both describing and 
applying a maxim justifying an interpretation other than the most natural reading of the statute.”  Id. 
at 157.  This historical practice thus lends additional credibility to this Article’s proposed amplified 
clear statement rule.  
 168. Id. at 166 n.274 (“Characterization of a canon’s application as a ‘magic words’ requirement is 
always pejorative; the Court itself disclaims the authority to so discipline Congress.”); see also Key 
Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 823 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress 
need not incant the magic phrase attorney’s fees’ in order to provide for their recovery); Gade v. Nat’l 
Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 112 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that preemption 
inquiry should turn on Congress’s clear and manifest purpose, not on magic words).  
 169. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe Nations, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985). 
 170. Nagle, supra note 18, at 810. 
 171. Manning, supra note 159, at 450. 
 172. Professor John Manning has suggested that defenders of clear statement rules often argue that 
the rule is “simply another permissible technique for enforcing the Constitution.” Id. at 402.  The 
magic words clear statement rule in the tribal immunity context can thus be viewed as the Court’s 
willingness to enforce the original meaning of the Constitution in a backhanded way.  
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unequivocally clear that it intends for a constitutional dubious interpretation.  
Indeed, the ordinary assumption is that Congress is presumed not to be 
attempting to pass unconstitutional statutes.173  Resting the proposed magic 
words clear statement rule on this premise grants the rule legitimacy, as it can 
be traced meaningfully to the Constitution—specifically, original doubt about 
the Indian plenary power doctrine.174 
Importantly, a magic words clear statement rule would also allow the 
Court to avoid thorny stare decisis questions as the proposed rule, in theory, 
would make the abrogation issue arise with less regularity.  A magic words 
clear statement rule in this context thus “affords room for adjustment without 
the institutionally costly step of overruling or spuriously distinguishing 
hardened constitutional doctrine.”175  The rule can function as a limited 
replacement to the alternative option of outright overruling dubious 
precedent.176  The rule can thus be used as a tool, wielded by judges, to enforce 
a dormant constitutional principle.177 
A magic words clear statement rule makes practical sense in this 
particular context as well.  Clear statement rules are designed to focus 
legislative intent on the specificity of statutory text, as they “incent cautious 
 
 173. See Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally Unconstitutional Law: The Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. REV. 281, 290 (2008) (discussing the presumption of 
constitutionality).  
 174. Manning, supra note 159, at 404 (arguing “that if the legitimacy of constitutionally inspired 
clear statement rules depends on the plausibility of tracing them meaningfully to the Constitution.”); 
see id. (noting that “the defining feature of constitutionally inspired clear statement rules is that even 
when a given interpretation of a statute would not violate the constitutional provision(s) from which 
the triggering value emanates, that interpretation might still be said to collide with the background 
value itself”).  
 175. Id. at 450 (arguing that “if the Court invoked clear statement rules or similar remedial devices 
only when there remained a residuum of doubt after full adjudication of the underlying constitutional 
question using conventional methods of constitutional exegesis” would carry some weight).  
 176. As discussed supra note 23, a magic words clear statement rule can be thought of, in some 
ways, as a corollary to the canon of constitutional avoidance.  That canon is founded on “the principle 
that federal statutes should be read to avoid raising constitutional questions, even when those questions 
might be resolved in favor of the statutes’ constitutionality.”  Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 
VA. L. REV. 347, 387 (2005).  Admittedly, “the canon telling interpreters to avoid even constitutional 
questions is hard to defend in terms of the enacting legislature’s likely intent; at least in modern times, 
there is no particular reason to presume that members of Congress systematically try to avoid gray 
areas and to refrain from pushing their power to its limits.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  Yet in this case, 
a magic words clear statement rule would simply be moving the intent target; not avoiding the intent 
question.  Stated differently, Congress would have to press the magic-words-intent button to trigger 
abrogation.  If that button is statutorily pressed, the Court has no choice but to wrestle with the 
constitutional question posed.  
 177. Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Magic Words, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 759, 774 (2015). 
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drafting.”178  Such rules thus impose a “clarity tax” on legislators, requiring 
them to express their intentions in anything less than exact magic words.179  In 
most scenarios, a magic-word-specificity requirement may admittedly be an 
undue exercise of judicial power.  Now Judge, then-Professor, Amy Coney 
Barrett argued that “such an aggressive use of clear statement rules violates 
the baseline rule of legislative supremacy.”180  Yet requiring Congress to use 
exceptionally clear textual language to achieve a statutory outcome that 
threatens to intrude upon sensitive constitutional areas, like the abrogation of 
tribal sovereign immunity for instance, may be an exception.  This is 
particularly true when dealing with terms like “domestic government.” 
In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the term “domestic government” 
is buried at the end of a long list defining what constitutes a governmental 
unit.181  When legislators passed the Act, it is doubtful that most stopped, 
paused, and pondered whether the phrase “domestic government” abrogated 
the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes.  Judicial insistence upon magic-
word-statutory clarity in the tribal sovereign immunity context may focus 
legislative intent on this precise question, while also increasing the burden of 
enacting legislation that abrogates tribal sovereign immunity.  A magic words 
clear statement rule would impose a clarity tax “upon legislation that seeks to 
achieve a constitutionally disfavored result,”182 setting a price Congress must 
pay before intruding upon constitutional values.183  In other words, a magic 
words clear statement rule requires Congress to specifically focus on certain 
constitutional values before disturbing them.184 
As there exists reason to doubt the original correctness of the Indian 
plenary power doctrine, courts should adopt a magic words clear statement 
rule to make it more challenging for Congress to exercise this dubious power.  
This rule would force Congress to focus specifically on tribal sovereign 
immunity before abrogating it.  It also provides an alternative option to the 
 
 178. Id. at 772; Nagle, supra note 18, at 805 (“Such rules protect special values by requiring 
deliberate legislative consideration before a court will conclude that the legislature decided to act 
contrary to those values.”). 
 179. Manning, supra note 159, at 403. 
 180. Barrett, supra note 21, at 166–67. 
 181. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27). 
 182. Manning, supra note 159, at 425. 
 183. Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial 
Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 11–16 (2008). 
 184. Nagle, supra note 18, at 803–04. 
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judicially costly route of overruling precedent.185  If the statute does contain 
the magic words then Congress has elected to press the issue—an attempt to 
exercise a power it may, as an original matter, not even possess.186 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While probably surprising to some, the Court’s originalist jurists most 
frequently question Congress’s use of its plenary power authority over Indian 
tribes.  They are also the most hesitant to strip tribes of their sovereign 
immunity.  In a recent case, Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, stated 
that “[d]etermining the limits on the sovereign immunity held by Indian tribes 
is a grave question; the answer will affect all tribes, not just the one before 
us.”187  Basing his premise on the Constitutional text and founding era 
contextual history, Justice Thomas views the plenary power doctrine as “a 
power grab.”188  In light of both the historical context of the Constitution’s 
ratification and the Constitution’s text itself, these Justices appear wise to 
doubt the original correctness of the Indian plenary power doctrine.189 
Indeed, original doubt about the Indian plenary power doctrine makes 
constitutional sense.  The absence of any express federal power to abrogate 
Indian sovereign immunity is logical, given that “when the Constitution was 
drafted, Indian tribes were highly autonomous and viewed as a serious 
external threat to the security of the new nation.”190  This means that Indian 
 
 185. Practically speaking, this approach calls for the court’s inquiry to end, and the Indian tribe’s 
sovereign immunity be maintained, whenever the statute does not contain the requisite magic words 
(i.e. Indian tribes or a closely associated term). 
 186. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 
960 (1992) (suggesting that the most significant canons used by the Supreme Court reflect a preference 
for continuity that “is in fact a useful guideline in discerning legislative purpose”).  
 187. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649, 1654 (2018). 
 188. Ledford, supra note 70, at 197.  Justice Thomas has rejected the Court’s holding “that the 
Constitution grants to Congress plenary power to calibrate the ‘metes and bounds of tribal 
sovereignty.’”  United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 189. Ledford, supra note 70, at 202. 
 190. Cleveland, supra note 68, at 26.  Indeed, the tribal-federal relationship is textually rooted in 
treaty negotiations—a mechanism that is explicitly outlined in Article II.  Ledford, supra note 70, at 
202; see also Sorenson, supra note 39, at 99 (noting that “the executive treatymaking power in Article 
II, Section 2, though not explicitly mentioning tribal nations, also played an important role in federal 
and tribal relations from the founding until 1871”).  Up until the turn of the twentieth century, 
moreover, “U.S. power over the Indians had been considered limited to actions authorized by the 
Commerce, War, and Treaty Clauses.”  Cleveland, supra note 68, at 73.  
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tribal sovereign immunity is properly regarded as constitutional backdrop.191  
Although itself not contained in the text of the Constitution,192 the principle 
was explicitly incorporated by reference, understood to be independently 
insulated from congressional change, and for nearly a century imposed limits 
on congressional power.193  Federal Indian law today thus concerns legal 
doctrines unmoored to text or history and stands “contrary to the basic 
assumptions of our common law tradition, which forbid nonconsensual 
deprivations of the fundamental interests of those who have not through their 
fault contributed to the problems of others.”194 
This Article’s proposed magic words clear statement rule is premised on 
the dubious original correctness of the Indian plenary power doctrine.  
Original doubt provides a basis for the Court to restrict Congress’s uncertain 
authority to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.  As this Article contends, the 
magic words clear statement rule should govern the question whether a statute 
has abrogated tribunal immunity.  The legislature must use magic words 
(expressly mentioning Indian tribes or a closely associated term) that leaves 
no doubt about Congress’s intent to abrogate tribal immunity.195  This 
 
 191. Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1816 (2012) 
(defining “constitutional backdrops” as “rules of law that aren’t derivable from the Constitution’s text, 
but instead are left unaltered by the text, and in fact are protected by the text from various kinds of 
legal change”). 
 192. Seielstad, supra note 27, at 683 (“[T]he doctrine has long been recognized by all three branches 
of the federal government as an essential and inherent element of tribal sovereignty.”); see also Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (“Indian tribes have long been recognized as 
possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”); Steele, 
supra note 29, at 678 (“The Supreme Court has affirmed that tribal sovereignty does not derive from 
a delegation of federal authority, but endures as aboriginal authority that predates the Constitution and 
has never been extinguished.”). 
 193. Sachs, supra note 191, at 1888 (“Constitutional backdrops are rules of law that function like 
constitutional rules, but are not contained in the Constitution.  These include rules that were explicitly 
incorporated by reference, that were independently insulated from change, or that durably limit the 
scope of the text’s language.”); see also Krakoff, supra note 2, at 529 (“Tribes’ political status is 
woven into the text and structure of our Constitution.”). 
 194. Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and Commentary: The 
Malaise of Federal Indian Law through the Lens of Lone Wolf, 38 TULSA L. REV. 5, 9 (2013); see also 
Pearl, supra note 18, at 335 (“This Article argues that the implication from the enumerated authorities 
and separation of powers compels the conclusion that Indian tribes were distinct communities 
independent of the newly formed United States.”); Bevilacqua, supra note 2, at II.–159 (“Indian tribes 
possess a level of common-law sovereign immunity that can only be abrogated through actions by 
Congress or through waiver by the tribe itself.”). 
 195. In this way, the magic words clear statement rule would permit a judge to forgo the ‘best’ 
interpretation of a statutory provision in favor of constraining Congress’s authority to exercise an 
uncertain power.  Bednar, supra note 166, at 836. 
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proposed rule supports the proposition that “originalism actually provides a 
basis to advance a strong vision of tribal sovereignty and an exceptionally 
limited federal role in tribal communities.”196  It also recognizes that the “story 
of federal Indian law is a study in the art of using the shards of adverse 
precedent to cobble together enduring arguments and principles from what 
remains.”197  It may finally be time to chart a different course.  A good place 
to start would be to constrain a congressional power that does not derive from 
either the Constitution’s text or historical practice.  A magic words clear 
statement rule would do just that. 
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